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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to show that partial probability can be justified
from the standpoint of subjective probability in much the same way as
classical probability does. The seminal works of Ramsey and De Finetti
have furnished a method for assessing subjective probabilities: ask about
the bets the decision-maker would be willing to place. So we introduce
the concept of partial bet and partial Dutch Book and prove for partial
probability a result similar to the Ramsey-De Finetti theorem. Finally, we
make a comparison between two concepts of bet: we can bet our money
on a sentence describing an event, or we can bet our money on the event
itself, generally conceived as a set. These two ways of understanding a
bet are equivalent in classical probability, but not in partial probability.
Keywords: Dutch Book theorem; non-classical probability; Kleene’s
Logic.
1 Partial probability
Classical probability theory is grounded on the concept of probability space,
a triple (A, CA, p) where A is a sample space, CA is a field of sets on A and
p : CA → [0, 1] is a probability measure, i.e. a function satisfying Kolmogoroff’s
axioms: 1) p(A) = 1, 2) p(X ∪Y ) = p(X)+ p(Y ), when X ∩Y = ∅. In this way
probability is seen as the measure of an event represented by a set of outcomes.
Partial probability theory arises when we substitute classical events with partial
events (see [6]). If S is the sample space of an experiment, we define the set of
all partial sets on S as the set D(S) = {(A,B) : A,B ⊆ S, and A ∩ B = ∅}.
Every x ∈ A (resp.B) is said to be a positive (resp. negative) element of the
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partial set (A,B). Partial sets are structured by the following operations:
(A,B) ⊓ (C,D) = (A ∩ C,B ∪D),
(A,B) ⊔ (C,D) = (A ∪ C,B ∩D),
−(A,B) = (B,A),
0 = (∅, S),
1 = (S, ∅),
n = (∅, ∅).
The algebra D(S) = (D(S),⊓,⊔,−, 0, n, 1) is the algebra of all partial sets on
S. A field of partial set is any subalgebra GS ⊆ D(S). A partial set (A,B) is a
Boolean partial set if A = S − B. The set of Boolean partial sets is a Boolean
algebra isomorphic to P(S), the classical power-set algebra. We define a binary
relation between partial sets setting (A,B) ⊑ (C,D) iff A ⊆ C and D ⊆ B. It
can be easily proved that (D(S),⊑) is a partially ordered set with (S, ∅) as top
and (∅, S) as bottom element.
When S is a sample space, we say that D(S) is the algebra of partial events
on S. In relation with the experimental result s ∈ S, we say that (A,B) occurs
positively if s ∈ A, occurs negatively if s ∈ B, is uncertain otherwise. Events
of classical probability theory are to be identified with Boolean partial sets and
will be called Boolean or classical events.
We define on R2 the relation setting (x, y)  (w, z) iff x ≤ w e z ≤ y. (Note
that the natural order of R is reversed on the second elements of the ordered
pairs.) It can be easily shown that (R2,) is a partially ordered set. The
operations x+y, xy and −x in R are extended pointwise to the product R2, i.e.
(x, y) + (z, w) = (x+ z, y + w), (x, y)(z, w) = (xz, yw) and −(x, y) = (−x,−y).
We define the set of partial probability values T as a subset of R2, setting
T = {(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 : x+y ≤ 1}. The probability value of a partial event (A,B)
is a pair (x, y) ∈ T . The set of partial probability values T is partially ordered
by  with a maximum (1, 0) and a minimum (0, 1).
Given a partial field of set GS on S and a function µ : GS → T , we say that
µ is a measure of partial probability when the following axioms are satisfied:
1. µ(S, ∅) = (1, 0).
2. µ(A,B) + µ(C,D) = µ((A,B) ⊔ (C,D)) − µ((A,B) ⊓ (C,D)).
3. µ(−(A,B)) = σ(µ(A,B)),
4. (∅, ∅) ⊑ (A,B) implies (0, 0)  µ(A,B),
where σ : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 is defined by σ(x, y) = (y, x). As a consequence of
axiom 4, we have (0, 0)  µ(A, ∅), for all (A, ∅) ∈ ∇. A partial probability space
is a triple (S,GS , µ) where GS is a field of partial sets on the sample space S
and µ is a measure of partial probability.
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Given a classical probability space (S,P(S), p), we define the partial proba-
bility space associated to (S,P(S), p) as follows: we define µ : D(S)→ T setting
µ(A,B) = (p(A), p(B)).
As (A,B) is a partial event, A ∩B = ∅ so p(A) + p(B) = p(A ∪B): this proves
that µ(A,B) ∈ T . It can be easily proved that µ satisfies the four axioms
above, so (S,D(S), µ) is a partial probability space. For instance, we can start
from the classical probability space (S,P(S), p), where S = {n : 1 ≤ n ≤ 6}
and p(n) = 1/6 for all n ∈ S. If (A,B) is the Boolean event with A = {2, 4, 6}
and B = {1, 3, 5}, then µ(A,B) = (1/2, 1/2), and if (C,D) is the partial event
with C = {2, 4} and D = {5}, then µ(C,D) = (1/3, 1/6). If the outcome of
the experiment is 3, then we say that (A,B) does not happen and that (C,D)
is uncertain (neither happens nor does not happen). Some events like (A, ∅)
have only positive occurrences (may only happen), others like (∅, A) have only
negative occurrences, (∅, ∅) is the absolutely undefined event.
We list some differences between classical and partial probability.
1. (A,B) or not-(A,B) is no more the certain event, unless (A,B) is Boolean,
i.e. B = S − A. In general we can only say that µ((A,B) ⊔ −(A,B)) =
µ(A ∪ B, ∅)  (0, 0). For the same reason, (A,B) and not-(A,B) is not,
in general, the impossible event.
2. Additivity holds in the form of axiom 2, but now we have different kinds
of disjointness. In a field of partial sets D(S), the partial sets like (∅, X),
belonging to the interval [(∅, S), (∅, ∅)], are generalizations of the empty
set (they have no positive elements); so we can say that (A,B) is dis-
joint from (C,D) if (A,B) ⊓ (C,D) = (∅, X), for some X . Now the par-
tial probability of a sum of disjoint sets is the sum of their probabilities,
µ(A,B)+µ(C,D) = µ((A,B)⊔(C,D)), only when (A,B) and (C,D) have
the maximum degree of disjointness (∅, ∅).
3. Partial probability values are only partially ordered by , so we cannot
say, in general, whether a partial event is more probable then another
partial event or not. However, it can be easily seen that the set of partial
probability values of Boolean events is totally ordered by .
4. Conditioning on partial events is possible, but with a slightly different
meaning with respect to the classical case. See [6] par. 4 and [7] par. 9,
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The aim of this paper is to show that partial probability can be justified
from the standpoint of subjective probability in much the same way as classical
probability does. The seminal works of Ramsey and De Finetti have furnished
a method for assessing subjective probabilities: ask about the bets the decision-
maker would be willing to place. In par. 2 we introduce the concept of classical
bet and shortly review the proof of Ramsey-De Finetti theorem for classical
probability. The remaining part of this paper is devoted to prove an analogous
3
result in the case of partial subjective probability. To this scope we introduce
in par. 3 the fundamentals concepts of Kleene logic. In par. 4 we introduce the
concept of partial bet and partial Dutch Book and prove for partial probability
a result similar to Ramsey-De Finetti theorem. In par. 5 we make a comparison
between two concepts of bet: we can bet our money on a sentence describing
an event, or we can bet our money on the event itself, generally conceived as a
set. These two ways of understanding a bet are equivalent in the classical case,
but not in the partial case.
2 Classical bets
In the subjective approach to probability, the bearers of probability are no more
sets but sentences and the probability value is conceived as the degree of belief
in some event represented by a sentence. So we introduce a sentential n-ary
language Ln based on the sentential variables Pn = {p1, ..., pn}, the connectives
{¬,∧,∨} and the constants {0, 1}. (Through this text we deal only with finite
languages.) We denote with Fn the set of formulas of Ln and with Fn the algebra
of formulas. (We simply write L, P and F when no confusion is possible.) We
say that a function pi : F → [0, 1] is a probability function, if the following axioms
are satisfied:
1. if |= α then pi(α) = 1,
2. if |= ¬(α ∧ β) then pi(α ∨ β) = pi(α) + pi(β),
where |= is the consequence relation of bivalent logic. (See, for instance, [5]
or [8].) Both the measure-theoretic and the subjectivistic approach to classical
probability are deeply grounded on Boolean algebras. On one side the events of
a probability space constitute a Boolean algebra, on the other side the definition
of a probability function requires the semantics of bivalent logic and Boolean
truth-functions. Owing to this common ground, these two ways of presenting
probability can be translated one into the other (see, for instance, [7], par.4).
When does a function b : F → [0, 1], representing the decision-maker’s belief,
satisfy the axioms of probability function? The theorem that we are going to
prove, commonly attributed to Ramsey and De Finetti (see [3], p. 53), gives
a sufficient condition through the concept of bet. We understand a bet as a
triple (α, x, r) where α ∈ F , x ∈ [0, 1] and r ∈ R. The formula α represents the
event on which the bet is placed, x is the betting quotient and r the stake. By
accepting this bet, we agree to pay out rx to receive r from the bookmaker if
the event described by α takes place, and nothing otherwise. The buyer’s payoff
can be described by the following table:
r − rx = r(1 − x) if α is true in the actual world,
−rx if α is false in the actual world.
We can obtain the bookmaker’s payoff by changing the sign of the stake. In
general, when we talk of ‘payoff’, we understand the buyer’s payoff.
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The payoff is a function of α, x, r and of the state of the world that makes
α true or false. The definition of such a function requires some basic concepts
in the semantics of classical logic. We identify with 2n the set of all possible
worlds, where 2 = {0, 1} is the set of truth-values of classical logic. Then, for
every sentential variable pi, we can set Vw(pi) = wi: the truth-value of pi in
the world w. As F is the absolutely free algebra, we know that Vw can be
extended to a homomorphism Vw : F → 2, where 2 denotes the two-element
Boolean algebra: Vw(α) is the truth-value of α in the world w. We say that α
is a consequence of γ, in symbols γ |= α, when Vw(γ) ≤ Vw(α) for all w ∈ 2n.
We say that α is a consequence of the set of formulas Γ, and write Γ |= α, when
inf{Vw(γ) : γ ∈ Γ} ≤ Vw(α) for all w ∈ 2n. When Γ = ∅ we write simply |= α
and this amounts to Vw(α) = 1, for all w ∈ 2n, because inf{Vw(γ) : γ ∈ ∅} =
inf(∅) = 1. We say that two formulas α and β are equivalent and write α ≡ β
iff α |= β and β |= α.
The semantics of classical logic can also be defined through a function that
associates to every formula α its meaning M(α), conceived as the set of worlds
in which α holds true. To this end we define M(pi) = {w ∈ 2n : wi = 1}, for all
sentential variable pi: intuitively, M(pi) is the set of all worlds making pi true.
As F is the absolutely free algebra, we can extend M to a homomorphism from
F to the Boolean algebra P(2n). The functions Vw and M are related in this
way: given Vw, we can define M(α) as {w ∈ 2
n : Vw(α) = 1} and given M we
can define Vw(α) = 1 iff w ∈M(α) and Vw(α) = 0 iff w /∈M(α). So α |= β iff
M(α) ⊆M(β) and α ≡ β iff M(α) =M(β).
Now we return to the definition of the payoff. We associate to every bet
(α, x, r) a function [α, x, r]:2n → R that gives the payoff of (α, x, r) in the world
w by
[α, x, r](w) = r(Vw(α) − x) =
{
r(1 − x) if Vw(α) = 1
−rx if Vw(α) = 0.
This definition can be naturally extended to finite sets of bets as follows. If
B = {(αi, xi, ri) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, then we define the payoff of the set B in the
world w as
[B](w) =
n∑
i=1
{[αi, xi, ri](w)}.
We say that a set of bets B is a Dutch Book if, for all w ∈ 2n, [B](w) < 0.
Intuitively, a Dutch Book is a set of bets that guarantees a sure loss for the
buyer. There is, however, a weaker notion of Dutch Book that will be useful
in the following, where the set of bets can at best break even and, in at least
one possible world, has a net loss. We say that a set of bets B is a Weak Dutch
Book if, for all w ∈ 2n, [B](w) ≤ 0 and in at least one world w, [B](w) < 0.
(This kind of Dutch Book has been introduced in [9].) If we take the values of
b : F → [0, 1] as betting quotients, i.e. the bets in B are of kind (αi, b(αi), r),
and if a Dutch Book is available with such betting rates, then we say that there
is a Dutch Book for b.
Lemma 1 For all w ∈ 2n, Vw(α ∨ β) = Vw(α) + Vw(β)− Vw(α ∧ β).
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Proof. The proof is an easy calculation with truth-tables and is left to the
reader.
Theorem 2 If b : F → [0, 1] and there is no Dutch Book for b, then b is a
probability function.
Proof. Axiom 1, if |= α then b(α) = 1. If b(α) < 1, then B = {(a, b(α),−1)}
is a Dutch Book because, for all w ∈ 2n, Vw(α) = 1 and then
[B](w) = [α, b(α),−1](w) = −1(Vw(α) − b(α)) = b(α)− 1 < 0.
Axiom 2, if |= ¬(α ∧ β) then b(α ∨ β) = b(α) + b(β). Firstly we prove that
if |= ¬α then b(α) = 0. (1)
If 0 < b(α), then B = {(a, b(α), 1)} is a Dutch Book because, for all w ∈ 2n,
Vw(α) = 0 and then [B](w) = [α, x, 1](w) = 1(Vw(α)− x) = 0− x < 0.
Secondly we show that
b(α ∨ β) + β(α ∧ β) = b(α) + b(β). (2)
Let b(α) = x, b(β) = y, b(α ∨β) = z, and β(α ∧ β) = w. If z + w > x + y, we
define B = {(α∨β, z, 1), (α∧β,w, 1), (α, x,−1), (β, y,−1)}. We show that B is
a Dutch Book. For all w ∈ 2n, we have
[B](w) = (Vw(α ∨ β)− z) + (Vw(α ∧ β)− w) + (x− Vw(α)) + (y − Vw(β))
= (Vw(α ∨ β) + Vw(α ∧ β)− Vw(α) − Vw(β)) + (x + y − z − w)
= x+ y − z − w
< 0,
because Vw(α ∨ β) + Vw(α ∧ β) − Vw(α) − Vw(β) = 0 by the above lemma. If
z + w < x+ y, just change the sign of the stakes.
Now we can easily prove axiom 2: if |= ¬(α ∧ β) then b(α ∧ β) = 0, by 1, so
b(α ∨ β) = b(α) + b(β) follows from 2.
3 Partial subjective probability and Kleene logic
As we have seen in par. 2, classic probability can be understood as a degree
of belief in a sentence. We can do the same with partial probability: we have
only to shift from bivalent logic to Kleene logic and from probability values in
[0, 1] to probability values in T . This should justify a brief digression in the
semantics of Kleene logic.
The language of Kleene n-ary logic is L∗n = Ln∪{n}, where Ln is the n-ary
language of classical logic introduced in par. 2. We denote with F ∗n the set of
formulas of L∗n and with F
∗
n the algebra of n-ary formula. We write simply L
∗,
F ∗ and F∗ when no confusion is possible. We denote with K the set {0, n, 1} of
truth-values of Kleene logic, where n stands for ‘neutral’ or ‘uncertain’. Every
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w ∈ Kn cas be seen as an instantaneous description of the world, at the level of
the atomic facts represented by sentential variables, so we can define a function
Vw from {pi : i ≤ n} to K setting Vw(pi) = wi. When wi = n, the atomic fact
represented by pi neither happens nor does not happen. This uncertainty may
be of an epistemic kind, related to a lack of knowledge, or may be deeply rooted
in the reality. The next step is extending Vw to all formulas an to this end we
give an algebraic structure to the set of truth-values as follows: we define on K
the total order 0 < n < 1 and define x ∧ y = min(x, y) and x ∨ y = max(x, y),
what amounts to giving the following truth-tables:
∧ 1 0 n
1 1 0 n
0 0 0 0
n n 0 n
∨ 1 0 n
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 n
n 1 n n
As for negation, we set ¬(n) = n, ¬(0) = 1, ¬(1) = 0. Finally, we denote with
K the algebra (K,∧,∨,¬, 0, 1, n). As F∗ is the absolutely free algebra, we can
extend Vw to an homomorphism Vw : F → K. So we say that α is true in w
iff Vw(α) = 1, false if Vw(α) = 0 and neutral if Vw(α) = n. We say that two
formulas α and β are equivalent and write α ≡ β iff Vw(α)w = Vw(β)w, for all
w ∈ Kn.
The semantics of Kleene logic can also be defined through a function that
associates to every formula α its meaning M(α) conceived as a partial set in
D(Kn), whereM(α)0 andM(α)1 are the set of worlds in which α is respectively
true and false, the positive and the negative models of α. Firstly, we define a
function M : {pi : i ≤ n} → D(Kn) setting
M(pi) = ({w ∈ K
n : wi = 1}, {w ∈ K
n : wi = 0}).
As F∗ is free, we extend M to a homomorphism M : F → D(Kn). Then the
meanings of formulas can be recursively defined by the following equations:
M(α ∧ β) = M(α) ⊓M(β),
M(α ∨ β) = M(α) ⊔M(β),
M(¬α) = −M(α),
M(0) = (∅,Kn),
M(1) = (Kn, ∅),
M(n) = (∅, ∅).
These two ways of giving a semantics are equivalent: if we take the notion
of meaning given by M as primitive, then we can define
Vw(α) =


0 if w ∈M(α)1,
1 if w ∈M(α)0,
n if w ∈ Kn − (M(α)0 ∪M(α)1);
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if we take the notion of truth in the possible world w given by Vw as primitive,
then
M(α) = ({w ∈ Kn : Vw(α) = 1}, {w ∈ K
n : Vw(α) = 0}).
We define the notion of logical consequence as follows: α |= β iff M(α) ⊑M(β)
iff M(α)0 ⊆ M(β)0 and M(β)1 ⊆ M(α)1 iff every positive model of α is a
positive model of β and every negative model of β is a negative model of α. The
notion of logical consequence can be generalized to
Γ |= α iff ⊓{M(γ) : γ ∈ Γ} ⊑M(α).
In terms of Vs, the definition runs as follows:
Γ |= α iff, for all s ∈ Kn, inf{Vs(γ) : γ ∈ Γ} ≤ Vs(α).
As in the case of classical logic, an easy calculation based on truth-tables gives
the following theorem.
Theorem 3 For all w ∈ Kn, Vw(α ∨ β) = Vw(α) + Vw(β) − Vw(α ∧ β).
Now we can define the notion of partial probability function. As the axioms
of probability function (see par. 2) are modeled on Kolmogoroff’s axioms, so
the axioms of partial probability function are modeled on the axioms of measure
of partial probability introduced in par. 1. We say that pi : F ∗ → T is a partial
probability function if the following axioms are satisfied, where |= denotes logical
consequence in Kleene logic:
1. 1 |= α implies pi(α) = (1, 0),
2. pi(α ∨ β) = pi(α) + pi(β)− pi(α ∧ β),
3. pi(¬α) = σ(pi(α)),
4. n |= α implies (0, 0) 4 pi(α).
We call pi(α) the partial degree of belief in α of our decision-maker. The
following theorem shows some fundamental properties of pi.
Theorem 4 If pi is a partial probability function on L∗n, then
1. pi(n) = (0, 0).
2. α |= 0 implies pi(α) = (0, 1),
3. α |= n implies pi(α) 4 (0, 0),
4. pi(α) = pi(α ∨ n) + pi(α ∧ n).
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Proof. 1. From n |= n we have (0, 0) 4 pi(n), by axiom 4. In Kleene logic
we have n |= ¬n and so (0, 0) 4 pi(¬n). In general we have (x, y) 4 (x′, y′)
iff σ(x′, y′) 4 σ(x, y), thus σ(pi(¬(n))) 4 (0, 0). By axiom 3, σ(pi(¬(n))) =
σ(σ(pi(n))) = pi(n) holds. Thus pi(n) 4 (0, 0).
2. In Kleene logic α |= 0 implies 1 |= ¬α and so, by axiom 1, pi(¬α) = (1, 0).
Thus, by axiom 3, σ(pi(α)) = (1, 0) e pi(α) = (0, 1).
3. In Kleene logic α |= n implies n |= ¬α, so (0, 0) 4 pi(¬α) = σ(pi(α)) and
pi(α) 4 (0, 0).
4. pi(α ∨ n) = pi(α) + pi(n) − pi(α ∧ n) = pi(α) − pi(α ∧ n) by axiom 2 and
point 1).
4 Partial bets
A classical bet is a mechanism that receives a triple constituted by a sentence
α in the language L of classical logic, a betting quotient x ∈ [0, 1] and a stake
r ∈ R as input, and gives a payoff, represented by a real number as output. We
observe that both payoffs and stakes belong to R, besides, the set of truth-values
of sentences {0, 1}, betting rates [0, 1] and stakes R are related by {0, 1} ⊆
[0, 1] ⊆ R. As a result we have been able to define the payoff [α, x, r](w) of a
classical bet in the world w as r(Vw(α) − x).
When we consider a partial bet, we begin with a sentence α in the language
L∗ of Kleene and a betting quotient (x, y) ∈ T . The first step is finding a
common ground for truth-values of Kleene logic and partial probability values,
so we make K ⊆ T by giving a new definition of K. So, from now on, we
set K = {(0, 1), (0, 0), (1, 0)}. After all, the essential nature of truth-values is
immaterial, as long as their formal properties remain unchanged. If we restrict
to K the partial order  defined on T , we have (0, 1)  (0, 0)  (1, 0) where
(0, 1) stands for ‘false’, (0, 0) for ‘neutral’ and (1, 0) for ‘true’. We define the
algebra K of truth values as above. For reader’s convenience we write the new
truth-tables:
∧ (1,0) (0,1) (0,0)
(1,0) (1,0) (0,1) (0,0)
(0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1)
(0,0) (0,0) (0,1) (0,0)
∨ (1,0) (0,1) (0,0)
(1,0) (1,0) (1,0) (1,0)
(0,1) (1,0) (0,1) (0,0)
(0,0) (1,0) (0,0) (0,0)
As for ¬, we have ¬(0, 1) = (1, 0) and ¬(0, 0) = (0, 0). Finally we get a ho-
momorphism Vw : F∗→ K and Vw(α) will be the truth-value of α in the world
w ∈ Kn. The proof of lemma 3 remains obviously unchanged.
The second step is finding a common ground for partial probability values
and stakes, so we define a stake as a pair (h, k) in R2. The payoff of a partial bet
will be an element of R2 too. Stakes and payoffs are ordered by the same partial
order 4 defined on partial probability values. So R2 is the common ground for
truth-values, partial probability values, stakes and payoffs
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In view of the particular partial ordering of payoffs, some considerations are
in order. (And the same holds for stakes.) A payoff (h, k) has a positive part
h and a negative part k. If h > 0 then h is a reward and if h < 0 then h is a
loss, but on the second elements the order is reversed, so k > 0 is a true loss
and k < 0 is a true reward. The positive and negative parts may come from
completely different domains, so we may think the first value h representing the
gain or loss of money and the second value k representing a degree of physical
pain or gratification. What is essential is that we cannot in principle strike a
balance between the first and the second component of (h, k) and reduce the
pair to a single number.
As  is a partial order, we cannot say in general whether (h, k) is better
than (h′, k′), but we can make the following distinctions. We can partition R2
in three exhaustive and disjoint subsets: the diagonal δ = {(x, x) : x ∈ R}, the
pairs under the diagonal δ+ = {(x, y) : x > y} and the pairs over the diagonal
δ− = {(x, y) : x < y}. The elements of δ are ‘neutral payoffs’: if the first
component h is positive and so can be seen as a gain, then the second element
h represents a loss of the same intensity. The situation is reversed when h
is negative. The elements of δ+ give more reward than punishment and the
elements of δ− behave in the opposite way, so a payoff in δ+ can be seen as
‘good’ and a payoff in δ− as ‘bad’.
Now we can introduce the concept of partial bet as a triple (a, (x, y), (h, k))
where α is a formula of L∗n, (x, y) ∈ T , (h, k) ∈ R
2. We can describe the payoff
of the buyer for (a, (x, y), (h, k)) by the following table,
(h, k)((1, 0)− (x, y)) = (h(1− x),−ky) if α is true in the actual world
(h, k)((0, 0)− (x, y)) = (−hx,−ky) if α is neutral in the actual world
(h, k)((0, 1)− (x, y)) = (−hx, k(1− y)) if α is false in the actual world.
The net gain varies as the actual world w varies in the set Kn of the possible
worlds, so we define a function [α, (xy), (h, k)]:Kn → R2 that gives the payoff
of (α, (xy), (h, k)) in the world w by
[α, (xy), (h, k)](w) = (h.k)(Vw(α)− (x, y)).
We have [α, (xy), (h, k)](w) =


(h, k)((1, 0)− (x, y)) = (h(1 − x),−ky) if Vw(α) = (1, 0)
(h, k)((0, 0)− (x, y)) = (−hx,−ky) if Vw(α) = (0, 0)
(h, k)((0, 1)− (x, y)) = (−hx, k(1− y)) if Vw(α) = (0, 1.)
As in the case of classical bets, this definition can be naturally extended to finite
sets of bets as follows. If B = {(αi, (xi, yi), (hi, ki)) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, then we define
the net gain of the set B in the world w as
[B](w) =
n∑
i=1
{[αi, (xi, yi), (hi, ki)]}.
10
The definition of Dutch Book is slightly different from the classical case. The
payoffs of classical bets are in R with its natural order ≤, so 0 is an equilibrium
point between loss, negative real numbers, and rewards, positive natural num-
bers. The payoffs of partial bets are in R2 partially ordered by 4, where δ is a
natural separation between loss, the pairs in δ−, and reward, the pairs in δ+. So
we say that a set of partial bets B is a Dutch Book if, for all w ∈ 2n, [B](w) ∈ δ−.
Intuitively, a Dutch Book is a set of bets that guarantees more loss than reward
for the buyer. We say that a set of partial bets B is a Weak Dutch Book if, for
all w ∈ 2n, [B](w) ∈ δ− ∪ δ and there is at least one possible world w such that
[B](w) ∈ δ−: so in all cases we have no gain and in some cases a sure loss. If B
is a Dutch Book then B is obviously a Weak Dutch Book too.
Given a function b from the set F ∗ of formulas of Kleene logic to the set T
of partial probability values, we say that B is a (Weak) Dutch Book for pi if B
is a (Weak) Dutch Book and the bets in B are of kind (αi, b(αi), (hi, ki)), where
the betting rates are given by b. Now we can prove a result similar to theorem
2.
Lemma 5 For all (x, y), (z, w) ∈ T , if (y, x) 6= (z, w) and x+ z = y + w, then
there are h, h′, k, k′ ∈ R such that
1. hx+ h′z = ky + k′w,
2. h < k′ and h′ < k.
Proof. Firstly, we observe that x, y, z and w all belong to [0, 1] because
(x, y) and (z, w) belong to T . Secondly, if we set k′ = q+h and k = t+h′, then
we reduce ourselves to prove that there are q, t, h, h′, with q, t > 0 such that
hx+ h′z = (t+ h′)y + (q + h)w. (1)
Now we distinguish two cases.
Case1, 0 < y,w. The above equation can be rewritten as qw + ty =
h(x−w)−h′(y− z). From our hypothesis x+ z = y+w we have x−w = y− z,
so we obtain qw + ty = h(x− w)− h′(x − w) that can also be written as
q = −
y
w
t+
(h− h′)(x − w)
w
, (2)
a linear equation in two unknowns q, t and parameters h, h′, w, x, y, with w, y 6=
0.This equation can be plotted as a line with negative slope, as t varies on the
horizontal axis and q on the vertical axis. We can choose h and h′ such that
the set of pairs (t, q) satisfying (1), with t, q > 0, is not empty. To this scope
we make the t-intercept positive and the q-intercept positive, i.e.
t =
(h− h′)(x − w)
y
> 0 and q =
(h− h′)(x − w)
w
> 0,
by choosing : i) h > h′ if x > w, ii) h′ > h if w > x. (Remember that w, y 6= 0.)
With such a choice of h and h′, any pair (t, q) such that (2) holds and
0 ≤ t ≤
(h− h′)(x− w)
y
and 0 ≤ q ≤
(h− h′)(x− w)
w
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gives a solution. (The case x = w is impossible, because from x = w and the
hypothesis x + z = y + w we have y = z, that is contrary to our hypothesis
(y, x) 6= (z, w).)
Case 2, y = 0, or w = 0.
Subcase a), y = 0. Firstly we prove that w 6= 0 and z 6= 0. If w = 0 then,
from our hypothesis x + z = y + w we have x + z = 0 and so x = z = 0. Then
x, y, z, w are all 0 and an absurd follows our hypothesis (y, x) 6= (z, w). If z = 0
then (x, y) = (x, 0) and (z, w) = (0, w), so from our hypothesis (y, x) 6= (z, w)
we have x 6= w. But x + z = y + w holds by hypothesis, so x+ 0 = 0 + w and
x = w, that is absurd. Now equation (1) reduces hx+ h′z = (q + h)w, because
y = 0 by hypothesis, that can be rewritten as
h(x− w) + h′z = qw.
By hypothesis, x + z = y + w = w, so x − w = −z, so the above equation
becomes −hz + h′z = qw, that can be rewritten as
q =
(h′ − h)z
w
,
where w > 0 and z > 0, so we get q > 0 by choosing h′ > h.
Subcase b), w = 0. The proof is similar to subcase a).
Theorem 6 If b : F → T and there is no Weak Dutch Book for, then b is a
partial probability function.
Proof. We prove that b satisfies the four axioms of partial probability
function.
Axiom 1. We must prove that 1 |= α implies b(α) = (1, 0), so we suppose
b(α) = (x, y) 6= (1, 0) and set B = {(α, (x, y), (−1,−11))}. We have, for all
w ∈ Kn,
[B](w) = (−1,−1)(Vw(α) − (x, y)) = (−1,−1)((1, 0)− (x, y)) = (x− 1, y).
From (x, y) 6= (1, 0) we have x < 1. (As (x, y) ∈ T , (x, y) 6= (1, 0) means (x, y) ≺
(1, 0), so x < 1.) So we have x − 1 < 0 and 0 ≤ y and then (x − 1, y) ≺ (0, 0).
So [B](w) ∈ δ− for all w ∈ Knand B is a Dutch Book for b.
Axiom 2. We must prove that b(α ∨ β) = b(α) + b(β)− b(α ∧ β).
Case 1: b(α) + b(β) ≺ b(α ∨ β) + b(α ∧ β). We set
B = {(α ∨ β, b(α ∨ β), (1, 1)), ((α ∧ β, b(α ∧ β), (1, 1)),
(α, b(α), (−1,−1)), (β, b(β), (−1,−1))}.
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Then we have, for all w ∈ Kn,
[B](w) = (1, 1)(Vw(α ∨ β)− b(α ∨ β)) + (1, 1)(Vw(α ∧ β)− b(α ∧ β)) +
(−1,−1)(Vw(α) − b(α)) + (−1,−1)(Vw(β)− b(β))
= Vw(α ∨ β)− b(α ∨ β) + Vw(α ∧ β)− b(α ∧ β) + b(α)−
Vw(α) + b(β)− Vw(β)
= (Vw(α ∨ β) + Vw(α ∧ β)− Vw(α)− Vw(β)) +
(b(α) + b(β)− b(α ∨ β)− b(α ∧ β))
= b(α) + b(β)− b(α ∨ β)− b(α ∧ β)
≺ (0, 0)
where the next to last line follows from lemma 3 and the last line from our
hypothesis. As [B](w) ∈ δ− for all w ∈ Kn, B is a Dutch Book for b.
Case 2: b(α ∨ β) + b(α ∧ β) ≺ b(α) + b(β). We set
B = {(α ∨ β, b(α ∨ β), (−1,−1)), ((α ∧ β, b(α ∧ β), (−1,−1)),
(α, b(α), (1, 1)), (β, b(β), (1, 1))}
and we get [B](w) = b(α ∨ β) + b(α ∧ β)− b(α)− b(β) ≺ (0, 0), so [B](w) ∈ δ−.
Axiom 3. We must prove that b(¬α) = σ(b(α)), so we suppose that b(¬α) 6=
σ(b(α)). Let b(a) = (x, y) and b(¬α) = (z, w), where (z, w) 6= (y, x) = σ(b(α)).
We distinguish three cases.
Case 1, x+ z < y + w. If we set
B = {(α, (x, y), (−1,−1)), (¬α, (z, w), (−1,−1))},
then we have, for all w ∈ Kn,
[B](w) = (−1,−1)(Vw(α)− (x, y)) + (−1,−1)(Vw(¬α)− (z, w))
= (−1,−1)(Vw(α) + σ(Vw(α)) − (x+ z, y + w)).
We note that
Vw(α) + σ(Vw(α)) =
{
(1, 1) if Vw(α) = (1, 0) or Vw(α) = (0, 1),
(0, 0) if Vw(α) = (0, 0),
so we have
[B](w) =
{
(−1,−1)((1, 1)− (x+ z, y + w)) = ((x + z)− 1, (y + w)− 1),
(−1,−1)((0, 0)− (x+ z, y + w)) = (x + z, y + w).
By hypothesis x + z < y + w, so in both cases [B](w) ∈ δ− and B is a Dutch
Book.
Case 2, y+w < x+z. We take B as in case 1, but change the stake (−1,−1)
in (1, 1), then we have
[B](w) =
{
(1 − (x+ z), 1− (y + w),
(−(x+ z),−(y + w)).
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In both cases we have a point in δ− because, by hypothesis, −(x+z) < −(y+w).
Case 3, x+ z = y+w. We show that there are stakes (h, k) and (h′, k′) such
that, setting
B = {(α, (x, y), (h, k)), (¬α, (z, w), (h′, k′))},
we have [B](w) ∈ δ− for all w ∈ Kn. Firstly we observe that
[B](w) = (h, k)(Vw(α)− (x, y)) + (h
′, k′)(Vw(¬α)− (z, w))
=


(h, k)((1, 0)− (x, y)) + (h′, k′)((0, 1)− (z, w))
(h, k)((0, 0)− (x, y)) + (h′, k′)((0, 0)− (z, w))
(h, k)((0, 1)− (x, y)) + (h′, k′)((1, 0)− (z, w))
=


(h(1 − x),−ky) + (−h′z, k′(1 − w))
(−hx,−ky) + (−h′z,−k′w)
(−hx, k(1− y)) + (h′(1− z),−k′w)
=


(h− (hx+ h′z), k′ − (ky + k′w))
(hx+ h′z, ky + k′w)
(h′ − (hx+ h′z), k − (ky + k′w)).
Then, by the above lemma, we can choose h, h, h′, k′ such that: i) hx + h′z =
ky + k′w, and ii) h < k′ and h′ > k. So in the first and third case we have
a point in δ− and in the second case we have a point in δ. This proves that
[B](w) ∈ δ− ∪ δ and B is a Weak Dutch Book.
Axiom 4. We must prove that n |= α implies (0, 0) 4 b(α). We suppose
that b(α) = (x, y) and (0, 0)  (x, y). We set B = {(a, (x.y), (0,−1))}. From
the hypothesis n |= α we know that, for all w ∈ Kn, Vw(n) ≤ Vw(α). As
Vw(n) = (0, 0), we have Vw(α) = (0, 0) or Vw(α) = (1, 0). Then, for all w ∈ Kn,
[B](w) = (0, 1)(Vw(α)− (x, y)) =
{
(0,−1)((1, 0)− (x, y)) if Vw(α) = (1, 0),
(0,−1)((0, 0)− (x, y)) if Vw(α) = (0, 0).
In both cases we have [B](w) = (0, y). As (x, y) is a partial probability value,
0 ≤ y ≤ 1; if y = 0 then (0, 0) 4 (x, y), but by hypothesis (0, 0)  (x, y), so
0 < y . Then we have (0, y) ≺ (0, 0), so [B](w) ∈ δ− and B is a Dutch Book.
5 Equivalence
We conclude our work with some remarks about the concept of bet. We start
with classical bets. If b : F → [0, 1] is to represent the degree of belief of a
decision-maker, logically equivalent formulas of classical logic should receive the
same probability value. We can show that this is the case, when there is no
Dutch Book for b. We suppose that α ≡ β in classical logic and b(α) 6= b(β).
If b(β) < b(α) we set B = {(α, b(α), 1), (β, b(β),−1)}, so we have [B](w) =
Vw(α)− Vw(β) + b(β)− b(α) = b(β)− b(α) < 0 and B is a Dutch Book for b. If
b(α) < b(β) we choose a stake −1 for the bet on α and a stake 1 for the bet on
β.
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From this observation we can see that the concept of bet introduced above
is substantially equivalent to another that is common in the literature (see, for
instance, [4] p. 20-23). In fact, we can define a bet as a triple (U, x, r), where
U ⊆ 2n, x ∈ [0, 1] and r ∈ R, so in this way we are betting on an event, a set
of possible world U , instead of betting on a formula α. If we denote with B the
set of all bets of kind (α, x, r) and define a relation (α, x, r) ∼ (β, x, r) iff α ≡ β,
then ∼ is an equivalence relation and we can take the quotient B/ ∼. Now there
is a bijection f between B/ ∼ and the set of all bets of kind (U, x, r): just set
f(|(α, x, r)|) = (M(α), x, r), whereM(α) denotes the set of possible worlds that
is the meaning of α, as defined in 2. The function f is well defined because if
(α, x, r) ∼ (β, x, r) then α ≡ β and M(α) = M(β). The function is obviously
injective and is surjective because every U ⊆ 2n is M(α) for some α. (This
follows from the theorem on disjunctive normal form of classical logic.) As a
consequence of the observation above, all bets in the class |(α, x, r)| behave in
the same way with respect to b, when no Dutch Book is possible for b, so we
can attach the probability value b(α) to the class |(α, x, r)| and this value can
be transferred to M(α).
The same problem can be posed for partial bets: if b : F ∗ → T is to represent
the partial degree of belief of a decision-maker, logically equivalent formulas
of Kleene logic should receive the same partial probability value. The following
theorem proves that this is the case when there is no Dutch Book for b.
Theorem 7 Let b : F ∗ → T and suppose that there is no Dutch Book for b. If
α ≡ β in Kleene logic then b(α) = b(β).
Proof. We assume that α ≡ β and b(α) = (x, y) 6= (z, w) = b(β), then we
show that there is a Dutch Book for b.
Case 1, z − x < w − y. We set B = {(α, (x, y), (1, 1)), (β, (z, w), (−1,−1))}
Then
[B](w) = (1, 1)(Vw(α) − (x, y)) + (−1,−1)(Vw(β) − (z, w))
= (1, 1)Vw(α)− (1, 1)(x, y)) + (−1,−1)Vw(β)− (−1,−1)(z, w)
= −(x, y)− (−z,−w)
= (z − x,w − y).
As (z − x,w − y) ≺ (0, 0), we have [B](w) ∈ δ− and B is a Dutch Book.
Case 2, w − y < z − x. We set B = {(α, (x, y), (−1,−1)), (β, (z, w), (1, 1))}
so that [B](w) = (x− z, y − w) ∈ δ−.
Case 3, z − x = w − y. Firstly we observe that z − x 6= 0. (If z − x = 0
then w − y = 0 and x, y, z and w are all 0, that is contrary to our hypothesis
(x, y) 6= (z, w).) Then we distinguish two cases.
Subcase a), z − x < 0. Then w − y < 0 and y − w > 0, so z − x <
y − w and ( z − x < y − w) ∈ δ−. We obtain a Dutch Book choosing B =
{(α, (x, y), (1,−1)), (β, (z, w), (−1, 1))}, because in this case [B](w) = (z−x, y−
w).
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Subcase b), 0 < z − x. We set B = {(α, (x, y), (−1, 1)), (β, (z, w), (1,−1))}.
Now we can take equivalence classes of partial bets, as we did in the case
of classical bets. As all bets in the class |(α, x, r)| behave in the same way with
respect to b, when no Dutch Book is possible for b, we can attach the par-
tial probability value b(α) to the class |(α, (x, x′), (r, r′))|, but here the analogy
breaks off. If we define a concept of bet where the formula α is replaced by a par-
tial set of possible worlds, i.e. we define a bet as a triple ((U,U ′), (x, x′), (r, r′)),
where (U,U ′) ⊆ D(Kn), (x, x′) ∈ T and (r, r′) ∈ R2, we obtain a more com-
prehensive concept of partial bet: there are bets on partial events that can-
not be simulated by a bet on a sentence. In fact, we may define a function
f(|(α, (x, x′), (r, r′)|) = (M(α), (x, x′), (r, r′)) as above, where M(α) is the par-
tial set of positive and negative models of α defined in 3, but now f is strictly
iniective, because there are partial sets in D(Kn) that cannot be denoted by a
formula α. We end this work with a proof of this theorem.
The elements of K, that have been up to now understood as truth values,
may also be conceived as values assigned to the amount of information carried
by a proposition, to the degree of exactness of an assertion. (In this section we
take the original definition of K as {0, n, 1}.) To this end, we define on K a
partial order E setting x E y iff x = y or (x = n and y = 0) or (x = n and
y = 1). This partial order can be pointwise extended to Kn, so given s, t ∈ Kn,
s E t iff for all i < n, si E ti. The partially ordered set (K
n,E) has a minimum
n, the sequence that takes always n as value, and 2n maximal elements, the
sequences that take always 0 or 1 as value.
If s and t are seen as possible worlds, then s E t means that the situation
represented by t is at least so defined as the one described by s. What in s has
been definitely settled (marked with 0 or 1) remains unchanged in the passage to
t; what has not been definitely settled in s (marked with n) may be (positively
or negatively) settled in t. Whereas Vs(α) ≤ Vs(α) means that there is no loss
in truth-value in the passage from α to β, Vs(α) E Vs(α) means that there is
no loss of information.
Theorem 8 For all s, t ∈ Kn and all α ∈ F ∗,
1. if s E t then Vs(α) E Vt(α),
2. if s E t and s ∈M(α)i then t ∈M(α)i, for i = 0, 1.
Proof. 1. Firstly, we observe that the functions ¬, ∧, ∨ defined onK (see 3)
are isotone. (This can be easily verified by the reader.) Then we suppose s E t
and prove Vs(α) E Vt(α) by induction on α. If α = pi then Vs(pi) E Vt(pi)
holds, because si E ti. If α = β ∧ γ then by induction hypothesis we have
Vs(β) E Vt(β) and Vs(γ) E Vt(γ), so the result follows by isotonicity of ∧ with
respect to E. The same proof can be given for ∨ and ¬.
2. As we have seen in 3, s ∈M(α)0 iff V als(α) = 1. So from our hypothesis
s E t and point 1) above, s ∈ M(α)0 implies V alt(α) = 1 and t ∈ M(α)0. The
same proof holds for M(α)1.
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Corollary 9 The function M : F ∗ → D(Kn) is not surjective.
Proof. For all s ∈ Kn we have s E n , so if n ∈M(α)i then, for all s ∈ Kn,
s ∈ M(α)i, by the above theorem, and M(α)i = Kn. Let (X,Y ) be a Boolean
partial set, different from (∅,Kn) and (Kn, ∅). Then we have n ∈ X or n ∈ Y
and (X,Y ) 6=M(α), for all α.
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